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ESSAY
ANTI-DUMPING CIRCUMVENTION IN THE EU AND
THE US: IS THERE A FUTURE FOR MULTILATERAL
PROVISIONS UNDER THE WTO?
By Lucia Ostoni*
It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
I. INTRODUCTION
Dumping is a commercial practice based on price discrimination.'
It consists of selling goods in a foreign market often at a price lower
than the cost of production, or, in any case, at a price lower than the
price charged in the domestic market.2 This practice is finalized by
penetrating the targeted foreign market and, where possible, gaining a
relevant position.3 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
("GATT 1994") provides the general rules for determining when
* LL.M. University of Pittsburgh School of Law; J.D. (laurea in giurisprudenza)
Universiti degli Studi di Milano. The author would like to thank Professor Ronald
Brand and Maurice Odour for their precious comments.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
1. For the purpose of this essay, general reference is made to the classic treatise
by JACOB VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (University Chicago
Press, 1927) (1991). For a general discussion on anti-dumping policies and
international trade, the following texts are referred: ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 242-293 (2002); DAVID PALMETER, THE WTO AS A
LEGAL SYSTEM, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND POLICY 11-124 (2003).
2. See e.g., Konstantinos Adamantopoulos & Diego De Notaris, The Future of the
WTO & the Reform of the Anti-Dumping Agreement: A Legal Perspective, 24 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 30, 32 (2000).
3. See id. See also Jean-Marc Leclerc, Reforming Anti-Dumping Law: Balancing
the Interests of Consumers and Domestic Industries, 44 MCGILL L.J. 111, 115-116
(1999).
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dumping occurs and what measures need to be taken on such occasions.
Article VI of GATT 1994 ("Article VI") condemns the practice of one
country introducing products into the commerce of another at less than
normal value.5 Adopted on the assumption that artificial sales at lower
prices may damage a domestic industry and distort the dynamics of fair
competition and international free trade, this provision allows World
Trade Organization ("WTO") 6 Members to impose certain measures in
order to offset and/or prevent dumping practices causing or threatening
material injury to a domestic industry.7
With Article VI as the point of departure, WTO Members
concluded the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the "Anti-Dumping
Agreement" or "ADA").8 While Article VI is general and provides the
basic framework only, the ADA lays down the detailed rules relating to
the determination of dumping practices and the implementation of
protective measures by ADA Members.9 For example, ADA Members
are allowed to impose anti-dumping duties, even temporarily, in the case
that the export price of a product is less than the comparable price for
the like-product in the exporting country with regard to the ordinary
course of trade. 0
Though Article VI and the rules set under the ADA seek to arm
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. VI, 55 U.N.T.S.
194, as amended by the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations done at Marrakech, Apr. 14, 1994 [hereinafter GATT
1994]; see also Leclerc, supra note 3.
5. See GATT 1994 supra note 4, art. VI.
6. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement].
7. See GATT 1994 supra note 4, art. VI (1) and (2); see also, Leclerc, supra note
3, at 113.
8. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement On
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-dumping), Apr. 15, 1994, in WTO Agreement supra note
6, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legale/final_e.htm [hereinafter
ADA]. Under the ADA, dumping is not qualified as a negative practice. In fact, the
purpose of the ADA is not to ban the dumping strategy, but to allow anti-dumping
reactions by the WTO Members. See Adamantopoulos & De Notaris supra note 2, at
32-33 (pointing out that, unlike the ADA, both US and EU anti-dumping legislation in
force before the finalization of GATT 1994 defined dumping as an unfair practice).
9. See e.g., ADA, supra note 8, including accompanying text.
10. See id. art. 1-5, 7, 9-11, 14, 17.
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Members with the tools for confronting dumping practices, they are
inadequate in the face of trade practices specifically aimed at defeating
the very purpose for which they were promulgated." In fact, the
provisions do not contemplate strategies such as circumvention, a
process in which other states disguise their dumping activities to defeat
the reach of Article VI and the ADA.
12
The circumvention of anti-dumping measures is a trade strategy for
exporting complex manufactured products when an importing country
applies (or is likely to apply), anti-dumping duties for the protection of a
national industry that produces like-products. 3  Circumvention
strategies are based on hiding the origin of the dumped product by
confusing the customs authorities of the importing country, as well as
the trade players and consumers. 14 These strategies consist in altering
the product subject to anti-dumping measures or transferring wholly, or
in part, the manufacture and/or the assembly of this product from the
country of origin (to which the anti-dumping measure is addressed) to a
different country.'5
More specifically, there are four distinct types of anti-dumping
circumvention strategies. First, circumvention may consist of exporting
individual parts or components of a dumped product to an intermediate
third country, and assembling them there.' 6 Such a case is called third-
country circumvention. For instance, assume that Country A (the
importing country) is applying an anti-dumping duty order on color
television receivers from Country B.' 7 The producers of color television
11. See e.g., Leclerc, supra note 3, at 139.
12. See, e.g., David W. Leebron, An Overview of the Uruguay Round Results, 34
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 11, 20 (1995).
13. Id.; According to ADA supra note 8 art. 2.6 ("[T]he term 'like product'
("produit similaire") shall be interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike
in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product,
another product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely
resembling those of the product under consideration[.]").
14. See Leebron supra note 12.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Gilbert B. Kaplan, Anti-dumping, Countervailing duty, and National
Security Provisions in the 1988 Trade Act, 22 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 553
(1989). See also Adamantopoulos & De Notaris, supra note 2 at 56-58.
17. See, e.g., Color Television Receivers From Korea, 61 Fed. Reg. 1339 (Dep't
Commerce Jan. 19, 1996) (initiation of anticircumvention inquiry on anti-dumping duty
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receivers of Country B may export components to a third country, C,
assemble the final product there, and export it from Country C to
Country A.'8 In this case, no anti-dumping duty would be applied
because formally Country C is the place where the dumped merchandise
was manufactured, and the anti-dumping duty order was originally
addressed by Country A to the products imported from Country B. 9
The second type of anti-dumping circumvention, known as
importing-country circumvention, consists of exporting individual parts
or components of a dumped product to the country which is applying the
anti-dumping measure and assembling them there. For instance, assume
that Country A applies an anti-dumping duty order to typewriters from
Country B, thus producers from Country B may decide to ship
individual components of the typewriter to Country A, assemble the
final product there, and then sell the merchandise.20 In this case, no anti-
dumping duty should be applied because the original anti-dumping duty
order refers to like-products, while the imported merchandise is
components, and components differ from like-products because they
have their own separate specificity.2'
The third type of anti-dumping circumvention is when a part or the
entire production of the product subject to the anti-dumping duty order
is transferred from the original country of manufacture to the importing
country or to a third country. 2 In this case, the circumvention producer
order). In this case, the importing country (A) was the US, the country (B) subject to
the anti-dumping order was Korea, and the third countries (C) were Mexico and
Thailand.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See e.g., Brother Industries, Ltd. and Brother Industries (USA), Inc., 56 Fed.
Reg. 14922-01 (Dep't Commerce Apr. 12, 1991) (initiation of anti-circumvention
inquiry on anti-dumping duty order on portable electric typewriters). In this case, the
importing country (A) was the US, and the country (B) to which the anti-dumping duty
order was directed was Japan.
21. Id.
22. See e.g., Certain Carbon Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings From the People's
Republic of China, 59 Fed. Reg. 62-01 (Dep't Commerce Jan. 3, 1994) (affirmative
preliminary determination). In this action, the US Department of Commerce (DOC)
affirmed that the import into the US of pipe fittings that were finished in Thailand from
unfinished pipe fittings produced in the People's Republic of China constituted
circumvention of an anti-dumping duty order on certain carbon steel butt-weld pipe
fittings from the People's Republic of China.
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decides to move a manufacturing operation, which is more complex.
23
In the case of assembly analyzed in the previous paragraphs, the purpose
of transferring the final part of the production is to change the place of
manufacture of the product subject to the anti-dumping order, and
prevent the application of the duty to import activity.
The fourth type of anti-dumping circumvention, known as minor
alteration circumvention, consists of exporting products that are an
alteration of the product subject to the anti-dumping order.24  The
alteration may concern different minor aspects of the product subject to
the anti-dumping order such as the way the product is presented to
consumers. The circumvention practice is successful when the
variation is sensitive enough to create a distinction between the original
products without distracting consumers.
It can be easily argued that the tolerance of circumvention strategies
would imply the nullification of anti-dumping measures. Therefore, it is
logical to assume that countries which are victims of dumping are likely
to apply anti-dumping duties, and to discourage anti-dumping
circumvention by adopting proper legislation. Although the WTO
Members contemplated and implemented anti-dumping rules, they did
not expressly include common rules to prevent and suppress trade
strategies like circumvention. 6 This essay will examine why major
trading entities have failed to agree on the issue of circumvention and
propose a strategy for WTO Members to develop further in ADA
negotiations in their attempt to cure the practice of circumvention. Part
II will describe the failure of past negotiation of multilateral anti-
circumvention provisions at the Uruguay Round. Part III will analyze
the European Union's ("EU") and United States' ("US") domestic anti-
dumping legislation as it applies to the regulation of anti-circumvention.
The purpose of this analysis is to verify whether the provisions adopted
unilaterally by these two WTO Members are within the scope of the
23. Id.
24. See e.g., Certain Pasta From Italy, 63 Fed. Reg. 54672-01 (Dep't Commerce
Oct. 13, 1998) (affirmative final determination). In this case, the US DOC found that
importing from Italy a certain kind of pasta in packages greater than the packages
usually used to import the same kind of pasta (subject to an outstanding anti-dumping
duty order) was a circumvention operation.
25. Id.
26. See Adamantopoulos & De Notaris, supra note 2, at 56.
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ADA. Finally, in the light of the unilateral anti-circumvention
provisions domestically adopted by some of the WTO Members, namely
the EU and the US, Part IV will focus on the criteria that a common anti-
circumvention legislation, if any, should meet under the WTO rules.
Ii. ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION UNDER GATT 1994: AN UNSUCCESSFUL
ATTEMPT IN NEGOTIATING ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION REGULATIONS
BETWEEN WTO MEMBERS
Anti-dumping circumvention provisions were supposed to be
included in the final version of the ADA.2 7 In fact, Article 12 of the
Dunkel Draft (one of the last draft versions of GATT 1994),28 provided
that, under specific circumstances, anti-dumping duties could be
extended in the case of circumvention operations consisting of
assembling or completing a like-product in the importing country.2 9
Indeed, under the Dunkel Draft, the regulation of anti-circumvention
measures was quite limited.30 In particular, no sanction was established
in the case of the assembly or the completion of a product subject to
27. Id.
28. GATT Secretariat, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, MTN.TNC/W/FA/F-21 (Dec. 20, 1991)
[hereinafter Dunkel Draft].
29. See id. art. 12.1. These specific circumstances include cases in which it has
been established that: 1. the product assembled/completed had to be a like-product with
regard to a product which was subject to a definitive dumping measure; 2. the
assembly/completion operation had to be carried out by an entity which was related to
the original dumping exporter (i.e. under a contractual arrangement with the exporter);
3. the components used in the assembly/completion operation had to be, directly or
indirectly, sourced by the dumping exporter; 4. the assembly/completion operation had
to have started or expanded substantially after the initiation of the anti-dumping
investigation; 5. the total cost of the components used in the assembly/completion
operation had to be no less than the 70% of the total cost of all the parties used in the
operation, with the exception that no anti-dumping measure should be extended if the
value of the assembly/completion operation was greater than 25% of the ex-factory cost
of the like-product; 6. there had to be evidence of dumping concerning the difference
between the price of the product in the importing country and the normal value of the
product when subject to the original definitive anti-dumping duty; and 7. there had to be
evidence that the extension of the anti-dumping measures to the components was within
the scope of the definitive anti-dumping duty in order to prevent the injury to a
domestic industry with regard to the like-product.
30. Id.
2005] ANTI-DUMPING CIRCUMVENTION 413
IN THE EU AND THE US
anti-dumping orders that took place in third party countries.3
Furthermore, the extension of the original anti-dumping order to the case
of circumvention practice was possible only upon the application of
definitive anti-dumping duty orders, with the express exclusion of
extending the order for preventive purposes in the case of mere initiation
of the anti-dumping investigation.32 Finally, under the Dunkel Draft
provisions, anti-circumvention measures were applicable only if it was
possible to trace a relation between the alleged circumvention operation
and the original anti-dumping order such as in the case of the existence
of a commercial relation between the assembling operator and the
dumping exporter.33
Article 12 of the Dunkel Draft aimed to synthesize the following
two concurring and opposite needs: to limit the anti-dumping
circumvention of importing countries (like the EU and the US), and to
protect against the pervasive application of anti-dumping duties to
exporting countries (like Japan).34 The strongest criticism to Article 12
of the Dunkel Draft came from the US, which argued for the need of
strict anti-circumvention rules, and filed a proposal to extend anti-
dumping duty orders even in the case of third-country and minor
alteration circumventions.35 The majority of the WTO Members,
nevertheless, rejected this proposal,36 and, during the negotiations, the
31. See id.
32. See id. art. 12.1(i).
33. See id. art. 12.1(ii).
34. For a general discussion on the negotiation of the Dunkel Draft, THE GATT
URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY, 1986-1994, at 252 (Terence P. Steward
ed., 1999); Simon Holmes, Anti-Circumvention Under the European Union's New
Anti-Dumping Rules, 29 (3) JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 161, 164-165 (1995);
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, supra note 1, at 278-279; see e.g., Leebron supra note 12.
35. Communication from the United States, Proposal for Improvements to the Anti-
Dumping Code, MTN.GNG/NG8/W59 of December 20, 1989. See Norio Komuro,
U.S. Anti-Circumvention Measures and GA TTRules, 68 (3) JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE
5, 26-30 (1994) for comments on the position of the US during the Dunkel Draft
negotiation.
36. See PIERRE DIDIER, WTO TRADE INSTRUMENTS IN THE EU LAW 158 (1999).
[C]riticisms were made that each of these [U.S.] proposals allowed the imposition of
anti-dumping duties on parts and components or finished products without conclusion
on dumping on these parts.... The USA, however, responded that their proposal was
not contravening GATT Article VI because everything was dependent on
determination of whether the parts or altered products are "like" the product originally
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WTO Members prioritized other issues. As a result, since there was no
strong political interest in the adoption of multilateral anti-
circumvention provisions, no final agreement was reached, and Article
12 of the Dunkel Draft was deleted.37
Nevertheless, at the end of the Uruguay Round the WTO issued the
following decision which stated
Noting that while the problem of circumvention of anti-dumping
measures formed part of the negotiations which preceded the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994,
negotiators were unable to agree on specific text,
Mindful of the desirability of the applicability of uniform rules in
this area as soon as possible,
[The Ministers] [d]ecide to refer this matter to the Committee on
Anti-Dumping Practices established under that Agreement for
resolution,
8
In April 1997 (three years after the finalization of GATT 1994), the
WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices established an Informal
Group on Anti-Circumvention in order to promote the discussion and
make recommendations concerning this issue. At first, the Informal
Group on Anti-Circumvention focused on two issues: what constitutes
circumvention according to domestic legislation, and what the WTO
Members had done with respect to what domestically had been defined
as circumvention. 39 At the October 2001 meeting, the discussion was
opened to a third topic: how circumvention would be dealt with under
the relevant WTO rules, and which options would be deemed necessary
covered by the order.
37. See Adamantopoulos & De Notaris, supra note 2, at 56 ("[T]he relevant
provisions on anti-circumvention and country hopping were deleted when it became
apparent that a compromise could not be reached on the amendments proposed by the
United States on the Dunkel text.").
38. Decision on Anti-Circumvention Annexed to the Agreement Establishing the
Multilateral Trade Organizations, enclosed with the Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, done at Marrakesh, Apr. 15,
1994, available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
39. 2001 USTR Annual Report - World Trade Organization, at 43, available at
http://www.ustr.gov (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
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in the event of multilateral regulation.40
WTO Members decided to address again the unresolved issue of
anti-dumping circumvention at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference
that took place in Doha, Qatar in November 2001.41 At this Conference,
Members agreed on a mandate for negotiation on specific subjects,
which included the ADA.42  Though the negotiations were set to be
concluded by January 1, 2005, the pace has been ever so slow in part
because of the non-cooperative atmosphere generated by the recent US
anti-dumping policy.
43
40. Id. at 44.
41. The Ministerial Conference in Doha was surrounded by many factors, which
had negative effects on the possibility that the WTO Members would find a common
agenda (e.g., the geopolitical crisis following 9/11; the pressure due to the critical
attitude of some leading opinion movements concerning international trade; the relevant
position that developing countries claimed in the negotiating process). The Conference
was affected by a general lack of spirit of cooperation and the individual WTO
Members preferred to focus on specific instances inspired by individual needs. In
particular, in view of its imminent enlargement, the EU insisted on the issues of
agricultural subsidies, while the US affirmed the necessity to strengthen anti-dumping
and anti-subsidiaries measures. As it has been summarized, "[t]he goal in Doha was
quite limited:.. simply to agree on what issues should be put on the agenda for
negotiations." Richard W. Stevenson, Measuring Success: At Least the Talks Didn 't
Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001 at A12. For a general comment on the
Conference, see William A. Lovett, Reflections on The WTO Doha Ministerial:
Bargaining Challenges And Conflicting Interests: Implementing The Doha Round, 17
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 951 (2002).
42. According to the Ministerial Declaration adopted on November 14, 2001, the
negotiation process should consist of two steps: first clarifying the controversial issues
of anti-dumping regulation, and, then, improving the principles of the resulting
agreement. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Reach Agreement on Framework, Chairman
of Doha Round, 19/6 BNA INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORT 226 (2002). For a comment
on the results of the Doha Round, see Petros C. Mavroidis, The Meeting in Doha: keep
on keeping on, 36 (2) JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 167 (2002).
43. See Leclerc, supra note 3, at 139. One of the most controversial issues was the
decision of the Bush administration in March 2002 to impose an average 30 percent
tariff on selected foreign steel entering in the US. For a brief overview on the impact
that this decision had in the developing of international trade negotiations see Kevin K.
Ho, Between Empire and Community: The United States and Multilateralism 2001-
2003: A Mid-Term Assessment: Trade and Economic Affairs: Trading Rights and
Wrongs: The 2002 Bush Steel Tariffs, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 825. At the post-Doha
negotiation table, in particular the US adopted a critical approach on anti-dumping and
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During its 2002 annual meetings, the Informal Group on Anti-
Circumvention continued to discuss the definition of circumvention and
to analyze domestic rules and administration procedures for anti-
circumvention practices. 4 The US was the country most concerned with
"the need to strengthen rules to prevent circumvention of antidumping
measures." 45  In 2002, the US submitted to the Informal Group a
document stating, "while there was as yet no consensus on what
constitutes circumvention, Members would also benefit from general
guidelines on what does not constitute circumvention., 46 The activities
of the Informal Group on Anti-Circumvention continued regularly
during 2003, and the WTO Members continued to discuss the definition
of circumvention, and analyze the domestic provisions related to the
issue.47
The collapse of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun in
September 2003 further stalled the process of a successful negotiation of
anti-dumping regulation. Presently it seems unlikely that the Informal
Group on Anti-Circumvention will be able to propose and draft new
multilateral anti-circumvention provisions in the near future.
III. ANTI-DUMPING CIRCUMVENTION: UNILATERAL PROVISIONS IN THE EU
AND IN THE US
Absent uniform international regulation, several WTO Members
have domestically adopted anti-circumvention legislation.48  Under
GATT 1994, unilateral anti-circumvention regulation is legitimate and it
countervailing reforms, insisting on the necessity to limit the negotiations to unfair trade
practice and transparency rules. Daniel Pruzin, EU Sketches View on WTO Reform of
Anti-dumping Rules; U.S. Skeptical, 19/28 BNA INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORT 1198
(2002).
44. 2002 USTR Annual Report - World Trade Organization, available at
http://www.ustr.gov (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
45. Daniel Pruzin, United States Pitches WTO Agreement Identifying Breaks With
Anti-dumping Rules, 19/17 BNA INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORT 734 (2002).
46. See supra note 44, at 70.
47. 2003 USTR Annual Report - World Trade Organization, at 55, available at
http://www.ustr.gov (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
48. See generally ANTI-DUMPING UNDER THE WTO: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW
(Keith Steel ed., 1996). Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, as well as the
EU and US have adopted anti-circumvention measures.
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is consistent with its provisions.4 ' According to the methodology
adopted by the Informal Group on Anti-Circumvention, the analysis of
anti-circumvention domestic provisions may be a good starting point for
the purpose of defining prospective multilateral regulation. The cases of
the EU and the US may be particularly meaningful because, due to the
relevance of those two WTO Members in the international trade context,
it is likely that their unilateral legislation will influence the discussions
within the Informal Group.
A. Anti-Dumping Circumvention in the EU
The EU's approach to the issue of anti-dumping circumvention is
embodied in Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of December 22,
1995 (the "EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation").50 Since the
ADA is binding on WTO Members, 51 the EU Anti-dumping
Circumvention Regulation was adopted in order to comply with the anti-
dumping provisions of GATT 1994, and to harmonize the Community's
legislation with these principles and procedures. 2 Conscious of the
absence of multilateral provisions under the WTO rules, the EU
legislators have set up anti-circumvention provisions as an integral part
of the EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation.53
According to Article 13(1) of the EU Anti-dumping Circumvention
Regulation, the general conditions for the application of anti-
circumvention measures are:
49. See GATT 1994 supra note 4, art. XX(d).
50. Council Regulation No. 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on Protection against
Dumped Imports from Countries not Members of the European Community, 1996 O.J.
L 56 6.3 [hereinafter EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation]. For a general
comment on the implementation of GATT 1994 in the European Community with
respect to anti-dumping regulation, Peter L.H. Van den Bossche, The European
Community and the Uruguay Round Agreements, in IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY
ROUND 23 (Johan H. Jackson & Alan 0. Sykes eds.,1997); SEBASTIAN FARR, EU ANTI-
DUMPING LAW - PURSUING AND DEFENDING INVESTIGATIONS (1998).
51. See ADA, supra note 8.
52. EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 50. See also EEC
Regulations on Imports of Parts and Components adopted on May 16, 1990, GATT
Document, L/6657, March 22, 1990.
53. EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 50.
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1. A change in the regular pattern of trade between the Union
and third countries;
2. The impossibility to relate this change in the pattern of
trade to a due cause or to an economic justification rather
than the imposition of the anti-dumping duty;
3. Evidence that the remedial effects of the anti-dumping
duties are undermined in terms of the price and/or the
quantity of like products;
4. Evidence of dumping in relation to the normal values of the
like or similar products.
5 4
Due to the broad language of the EU Anti-dumping Circumvention
Regulation, it is possible to detect circumvention in the case of
operations of a different nature (such as minor variations of the dumped
product, or when the dumped product is combined with other products).
Article 13(2) of the EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation
expressly deals with cases of circumvention with regard to assembly."
To detect assembly circumvention, two conditions must be met.56 First,
an assembly operation must take place in the EU or in a third country,57
and there should be evidence that this operation started or increased
after, or just prior to, the anti-dumping investigation.18 Second, the parts
or components used for the assembly should have been imported from
the country subject to anti-dumping investigations or to the final order. 59
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. art. 13(2).
57. See Council Regulation No. 2423/88, 1988 O.J. L 209 (noting that as of July
11, 1988 regulations against dumped or subsidized imports from countries that were not
members of the European Economic Community did not provide anti-circumvention
measures in the case of assembly operations in third countries, but that the extension
was included in the present legislation in order to discourage the establishment of
productive operations in countries that were not EU members); see also Holmes, supra
note 34, at 166.
58. See EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 50, art. 13(2)(b)
(stating that circumvention may be detected even in the case of assembly operations
started or increased before the investigation, meaning that broad discretion is given to
the investigating authorities); see also Holmes, supra note 34, at 166.
59. See Commission Decision No. 2003/560/EC 2003 O.J.E.C. L 190/10, 1
(discussing Council Regulation No. 71/97 EEC, 1997 O.J. L 17, which extended the
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To meet the second condition, the parts or components imported from
the country subject to the anti-dumping measure and used in the
assembly operation must be at least 60% of the total value of the parts
used in the operation or 60% of the value of the final product.60 This
means that at least 60% of the value of the parts/components must
consist of products originating in the dumping country, and the
remaining parts/components (which would constitute 40% or less of the
total value) would be from the EU or from third countries. 61 In any case,
under the EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation, circumvention
is excluded if the value consequent to the assembly or completion
operation is greater than 25% of the manufacturing cost.62 This last
condition is quite restrictive, since the test takes into account the value
added during the assembly operation, but not the value of the
parts/components used during the operation, even if these parts
originated in the EU.63
Case law has held that paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 13 of the
EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation are cumulative, which
means that, in order to apply anti-circumvention sanctions in the case of
assembly operation, the conditions listed in Article 13(1) must be met in
definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Council Regulation No. 247/93 on bicycles
originating in the People's Republic of China to imports of certain bicycle parts from
the People's Republic of China, and levying the extended duty on such imports
registered under Council Regulation No. 703/96 EEC, 1997 O.J. L 016); see also
Bicycle Parts from China, 1997 O.J.E.C. L 16 (noting that if in fact mere origin were
required, anti-circumvention sanctions might be avoided by exporting the components
from the dumping country to intermediate countries, and then to the assembly country);
see also DIDIER, supra note 36, 167-168.
60. See EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 50, art. 13(2)(b).
61. See Holmes, supra note 34, at 167 (discussing that prior EEC anti-
circumvention legislation provided the extension of anti-dumping duties in the case of
circumvention consisting of assembling in the European Community parts that
originated in the dumped country if these parts represented at least 50% of the value of
all parts); see also Council Regulation 2423/88, art. 13(10)(a), 1988 O.J. L 209.
62. See EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 50, art. 13(2)(b).
63. See Holmes, supra note 34, at 169 (arguing "[T]his test differs in two respects
to the 'value-added' test sometimes applied in determining the origin of the product.
First, the origin tests generally take into accounts not only the value-added during the
'assembly or completion operations,' but also the value of locally sourced parts.
Second, in origin cases, the value-added is compared, not with the 'manufacturing cost'
but with the ex-works price of the finished products.")
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addition to the conditions required under Article 13(2).64
If circumvention is suspected, the Community industry may file
written request to the EU Commission giving evidence of the
circumventing practice. 65  The EU Commission may then initiate a
proper investigation, and terminate the procedure within nine months
from the filing of the request. 66 The main purpose of this investigation is
to find the persistence of material injury to the interest of the
Community upon which the anti-dumping measures were originally
adopted.67 In fact, if material injury persists despite the application of
anti-dumping measures, circumvention would be deemed the most likely
cause.
68
In order to verify if the conditions under Article 13 of the EU Anti-
dumping Circumvention Regulation are met, it is necessary to
determine: 1) if the remedial effects of the anti-dumping measures have
been undermined; and 2) if dumping persists with respect to the normal
value of the like or similar product as was established in the
investigation before the adoption of the anti-dumping measures. 69 First,
the investigating authorities take the price of the dumped product (as it
was calculated during the original anti-dumping investigation). Then,
they add the anti-dumping duties (in order to obtain the un-dumped
price). Finally, they compare the un-dumped price with the current
64. See Bicycle Parts from China, supra note 59 (noting that despite this decision
of the European Court of Justice, the cumulative interpretation of the two clauses is
controversial, because in Commission Regulation No. 88/97, regarding the
authorization of the exemption of imports of certain bicycle parts originating in the
People's Republic of China from the extension by Council Regulation No. 71/97 of the
anti-dumping duty imposed by Council Regulation 2474/93, the purpose of the
Commission was limited to examining if the assembly operation is within the scope of
EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation, art. 13(2)); see also Commission
Regulation No. 88/97, 1997 O.J. L 017; see also DIDIER, supra note 36, at 161.
65. See EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 50, art. 5.
66. Id. art. 13(3).
67. See id. art. 3 (stating that injury is relevant for the purpose of the application of
anti-dumping duties when it is "material" and "directed to the Community industry");
see also id. art. 3(1); see generally Marc Wellhausen, The Community Interest Test in
Anti-dumping Proceedings of the European Union, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1027
(2001) (commenting on the notion of "material injury to the interest of the
Community").
68. See Leebron, supra note 12, at 20.
69. See EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 50, art. 13(2)(c).
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export price of the alleged circumventing product. If there is a
difference, circumvention may be suspected.70
The second element, on which the Commission focuses to detect if
there is present injury to the interest of the Community, is the difference
between the alleged dumping price (calculated in relation to the like-
product engaged in circumvention operation) and the normal value of
the dumped product, as was calculated before the adoption of anti-
dumping measures. 71 For this calculation, problems may arise in the
case of products assembled in the Community: mere components are
exported and, therefore, it is not possible to calculate the present export
price of the dumped merchandise and to compare it with the "normal
value of the product" as it was calculated in the original anti-dumping
investigation. 72 Anti-circumvention measures will be applied if the price
difference is consistent with the difference detected during the prior anti-
dumping investigation.73
In the case of an affirmative investigation, the Council may decide
to extend the existing anti-dumping measure upon proposal by the
Commission.74 Sanctions are applied retroactively from the date of the
registration of the imports subject to the anti-dumping order.75
Circumvention sanctions are not cumulative: in the case of importing-
country circumvention by assembly, the anti-circumvention measure is
applied to the imported components, based on the value of the
components imported from the countries subject to the anti-dumping
duty order 76 In the case of third-country circumvention by assembly, the
70. See e.g., Vermulst infra note 130.
71. See EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 50, art. 2(1).
72. T.W. Huang, The Gathering Storm of Anti-dumping Enforcement in China, 36
(2) JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 255-283 (2002).
73. See EU Anti-circumvention Regulation supra note 50, art. 5.
74. Id. art. 13(3).
75. Id. (mentioning that under art. X(6) of GATT 1994, retroactivity is allowed
within 90 days from the application of the anti-dumping sanctions. However, if the
retroactivity effect of the anti-circumvention measures is longer than 90 days, doubts
may arise concerning the compatibility of the Regulation with the GATT 1994); see
DIDIER, supra note 36.
76. See e.g. Edwin Vermulst & Paul Waer, Anti-Diversion Rules in Anti-Dumping
Procedures: Interface or Short-Circuit for the Management of Interdependence, 11
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1119 (1990).
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sanction is applied to the final product based on its full value. 7
B. Anti-dumping Circumvention in the US
Like in the EU, the adoption of ADA has induced the US legislators
to provide a new set of rules on anti-dumping circumvention.78 These
new provisions were adopted to address specifically newly emerged
circumvention practices to which the previous domestic legislation did
not refer to appropriately.79
Under the present version of the Tariff Act § 781, 19 U.S.C. §
1677j, ("the "US Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation") there are
four different cases in which anti-circumvention measures may be
adopted.80  First, if merchandise of the same kind or class as the
merchandise which is presently subject to anti-dumping or
countervailing duties or anti-dumping findings, is completed or
assembled in the US, and the components are from foreign countries to
which the anti-dumping duties are applied. 81 In this case, the anti-
circumvention measures are applied if the assembly operation performed
77. Id.
78. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) L. 103-465, 109 Stat. 4809
(Dec. 8, 1994) amended the Tariff Act § 781, 19 U.S.C. § 1677j (1930), as enacted in
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No 100-418, § 1321(a)
[hereinafter US Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation]. For comments on the
URAA, See e.g. David W. Leebron, Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results in
the United States, in IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND supra note 50, at 202
(noting that under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, anti-
circumvention measures were adopted for merchandise completed or assembled in the
US or in a third country. As a requirement for the extension of the anti-dumping duty
order, the difference between the value of the merchandise sold in the US (or the value
of the merchandise imported in the third country) and the value of the imported
components had to be "small." Problems arose concerning the definition of "small
difference," because it allowed a broad discretion to the national administering
authority); see also Komuro, supra note 35, at 21-25; Ranier M. Bierwagen, GATT
Article VI and the Protectionist Bias in Anti-Dumping Laws (Studies in Transnational
Economic Law: Vol. 7) 58-61 (1990).
79. US Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 78, at (a) and (b); see
statement of Administrative Action, HR Doc. No 10 103-316, vol. 1 (1944) at 222-223
(expressing concern regarding assembly operations performed either in the US or in
third countries).
80. US Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 78.
81. See id. at (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B).
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in the US is "minor or insignificant," and if the value of the assembled
components is a "significant portion" of the total value of the
merchandise.
8 2
The second case when anti-circumvention measures can be adopted
is when merchandise of the same kind or class as the merchandise which
is presently subject to anti-dumping or countervailing duties or anti-
dumping findings, is imported to the US after having been assembled in
an intermediate country.83 If, in assembling its merchandise, an exporter
used components that were subject to an outstanding anti-dumping order
or anti-dumping investigation, or components that were produced in
foreign countries to which US anti-dumping measures were applied,
anti-circumvention measures may be adopted.8 4  Like in the case of
assembly in the US, in order to apply the anti-circumvention measures
some criteria must be met: the assembly operation, which took place in
the foreign country, must be "minor or insignificant," and the value of
the assembled components must be a "significant portion" of the total
value of the merchandise.85
The third case is when the merchandise subject to anti-dumping
measures is altered "in minor respects," regardless of the variation of
82. See id. at (a)(2) (noting that to determine if the operation is "minor" or
"insignificant," the DOC shall take into account several elements like the level of
investment, research and development in the US, the nature of the process which
occurred in the US, the extent of production facilities herein located, and the value of
the merchandise sold in the US); see also U.S. v. Mast Industries, Inc., 668 F.2d 501,
506-507 (1998). For an application of the Mast test, see Levi Strauss & Company v.
U.S., 156 F.3d 1345, 1347 (1998). (noting that the US courts have developed the so-
called Mast test of "incidental assembly," according to which the following elements
must be valued in order to determine whether or not the assembly operation was
incidental and therefore not relevant for the purposes of the extension of anti-dumping
duties under the minor or insignificant standard:
1. [whether] the cost of the operation relative to the cost affected component and the
time required by the operation relative to the time required for assembly of the whole
article were such that the operation may be considered "minor" (...) 2. whether the
operations in question were necessary to the assembly process (...) 3. whether the
operations were so related to assembly that they were logically performing during
assembly (... ) 4. whether economic or other practical considerations dictate that, the
operations are performed concurrently with assembly.
83. See US Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 78, at (b).
84. Id. at (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B).
85. Id. at (b)(1)(C) and (b)(1)(D).
424 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. X
FINANCIAL LA W
tariff classification, if any.86
Finally, the last case when anti-circumvention measures may be
hdopted is when merchandise is developed without substantially
changing its characteristics after the anti-dumping investigation is
initiated (so-called "later-development merchandise"). 87
Under the US Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation, the
administering authority will take into account several factors before
imposing an anti-dumping measure: A) whether the later-developed
merchandise has the same general physical characteristics of the
(allegedly) dumped merchandise; B) whether the purchase expectations
of the later-developed merchandise are the same as the (allegedly)
dumped merchandise; C) whether the later-developed and the (allegedly)
dumped merchandise have the same ultimate use; D) whether the sale-
channels of the later-developed and the (allegedly) dumped merchandise
are the same; and E) whether the later-developed merchandise is
advertised and displayed in a similar manner as the (allegedly) dumped
merchandise was.88
In the case of alleged circumvention, the U.S. Department of
Commerce ("DOC") is the domestic authority, which determines
whether to extend an existing anti-dumping measure to a particular
product.89 An investigation (so-called "scope ruling") can be initiated
either by the Secretary9" or by application filed by any interested party.91
The DOC has 45 days from the receipt of an application for an
investigation to issue a final ruling or to initiate a scope inquiry.92 The
difference between issuing a final ruling and initiating a scope inquiry is
that in the first case, the DOC can determine whether it can extend the
anti-dumping measure based on the filed application. In the case of a
scope inquiry, the anti-dumping administering authority needs further
86. See id. at (c); see also Wheatland Tube Company v. U.S., 161 F.3d 1365 (1998)
(holding that products which are insignificantly changed are within the scope of the
anti-dumping provision even if alterations remove them from the anti-dumping duty
order's literal scope).
87. Id. at (d)(1).
88. Id.
89. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225 (a) (2005).
90. Id. § 351.225 (b).
91. Id. § 351.225 (c).
92. Id. § 351.225 (c)(2).
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information before providing the final order.93
The purpose of a scope ruling is to determine the possibility of
including the circumventing merchandise within the scope of an
outstanding anti-dumping order or finding.94 This is possible even if the
assembly or completion operation that took place in the US or in a third
intermediate country is "minor" or "insignificant." 95 In particular, in the
case of an assembly or completion operation performed in the US, the
DOC will include the imported parts, or components within the scope of
the anti-dumping duty order, while taking into account their normal
value.96 When the DOC finds a circumvention practice, it will consider
additional factors before determining whether to extend the existing
anti-dumping measure, such as: a) a change in the pattern of trade
(including sourcing patterns of parts used to produce the final product);9
b) the affiliation, if any, between the manufacturer/exporter of the
merchandise at issue and the operator who performed the assembly or
completion of the merchandise within or outside the US;98 and c) the
increase in the import of the components after the initiation of the anti-
dumping investigations.99
The DOC is required to notify the International Trade Commission
("ITC") of the proposed inclusion of the circumvented merchandise in
the anti-dumping order. 00 The ITC may request a consultation with the
93. Id. § 351.225 (d) and (e). The extension of an anti-dumping measure is
possible without further inquiry into the applicant's allegations. The purpose of this
provision is to avoid delays in initiating a scope ruling. See Rina Goldenberg, Scope
and Anti-circumvention under the Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Laws: Recent
Statutory and Regulatory Developments, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAK ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE & INVESTMENT 933, at 946-950 (Practicing Law Institute ed.,
1998).
94. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225 (a) and (d) (2005).
95. US Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 78, at (a)(1)(C); 19
C.F.R. § 351.225 (i) (2005).
96. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225 (g)-(h) (2005). The normal value for the purposes of anti-
dumping measure is within the scope of 19 U.S.C. § 1677b.
97. US Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 78, at (a)(3)(A),
(b)(3)(A).
98. Id. at (a)(3)(B), (b)(3)(B).
99. Id. at (a)(3)(C), (b)(3)(C).
100. Id. at (e)(1) (stating "a decision by the administering authority regarding
whether any merchandise is within a category for which notice is required ... is not
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administering authority,'O and if it finds that the inclusion of the alleged
circumventing merchandise may constitute a significant injury, it will
advise the administering authority whether the inclusion is inconsistent
with the ITC's prior anti-dumping affirmative determination.10 2 If the
ITC does not object to the adoption of the anti-circumvention measure,
the ultimate scope ruling will be notified to all persons that participated
in any segment of the proceeding (so-called "scope service list").'0 3
C. Consistency of the EU and the US Anti-Circumvention Provisions
with GATT 1994
Even if differences exist with respect to the EU and US definitions
of the circumvention practice'04 and their administration procedures for
the extension of the anti-dumping duty order,'05 both the EU and the US
regulations treat anti-dumping circumvention negatively when it consists
of assembly operations that take place in third countries. 0 6 The issue of
the admissibility of sanctions against third-country assembly
circumvention is related to the definition of the origin of the
merchandise to which the anti-dumping sanction should apply.0 7 If the
subject to judicial review"). See also id. at (a)(3)(C) and (b)(3)(C).
101. Id. at (e)(2).
102. Id. at (e)(3).
103. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225 (n) (2005).
104. See US Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 78, at (b)(3)(B)
(1996) (noting that under US law, in order to adopt anti-circumvention measures,
evidence of the relation between the circumventing producer located in the assembly
country and the original dumper is required, but no similar provision is included in the
EU legislation); but see EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 50, art.
13(10)(a), (stating that under this regulation, the relation between the assembler and the
dumper is required).
105. See EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 50, art. 13(10)(a),
(recognizing that the EU legislation makes reference to a defined percentage of parts
from the country subject to anti-dumping measures: 60% of the total value of the
assembled parts); but see US Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 78, at
(b)(1)(C) and (D) (stating that the US provisions incorporate the idea that the assembly
operation must be "minor or insignificant," and that the value of the merchandise
produced in the dumping country must be a "significant portion" of the value of the
merchandise exported to the US).
106. See EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 50, art. 13(2)(b);
see also US Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 78.
107. See id.
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assembly operation in the third country does not change its
determination of the origin of the final product, no doubt should arise
about the consistency with ADA provisions.0 8 In fact, a product that is
assembled in a third country is still seen as formally originating in the
country to which the anti-dumping measures have been applied.'0 9
Therefore, the importation of the product seems to be within the scope
of the anti-dumping duty order as it was originally adopted.
More controversial is when the assembly operation implies a
change in the determination of the place of origin."0 In fact, if the
assembly or completion of operation determines a change in the
determination of the place of origin of the dumping merchandise, the
inclusion of this merchandise in the anti-dumping duty order implies the
extension of the anti-dumping measure to an import activity that was not
subject to the original anti-dumping investigation. This may be
inconsistent with GATT 1994, which provides that
no contracting party shall levy any anti-dumping... duty on the
importation of any product of the territory of another contracting
party unless it determines that the effect of the dumping or
subsidization, as the case may be, is such as to cause or threaten
material injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to
retard materially the establishment of a domestic industry. I'I
As an example, assume that Country A applies an anti-dumping
108. David Palmeter, A Commentary on the WTO Anti-Dumping Code, 30 (4)
JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 43, 65-66 (1996).
109. See GATT 1994 supra note 4, art. 111(4) (stating that "[t]he products of the
territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products
of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use").
110. Case C 177/96, Belgian State v. Banque Indosuez, 1997 E.C.R. 1-5659. Doubts
have arisen with regard to Article 13 of the EU Anti-dumping Circumvention
Regulation supra note 50, according to which, in the case of third-country assembly, the
anti-circumvention measure will apply if the components are "from" the country subject
to the anti-dumping measure. The issue has been whether the word "from" means the
provenance or the origin of the components. Case law has clarified that the origin of
the product is the relevant criterion for the application of the duty. See DIDIER, supra
note 36, at 167.
111. See GATT 1994 supra note 4, art. VI(6)(a).
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duty order to merchandise X from Country B. Under the GATT 1994,
the application of an'anti-dumping order to merchandise X from Country
C is possible only upon proper investigation. 1 2 Under the EU and the
US anti-circumvention regulations, in the case of third-country
assembly, the anti-dumping order may be extended if some conditions,
such as a change in the trade pattern" 3 or a chronological link between
the assembly operation and the adoption of anti-dumping duties against
the dumping country, are met." 4 However, neither the EU nor the US
has a domestic provision on circumvention that expressly requires the
type of anti-dumping investigation procedure required under Article 5
and Article 6 of the ADA, and the inclusion of the merchandise in the
anti-dumping order is essentially based on the mere fact that the parts or
components of the merchandise are from the country subject to the
original anti-dumping duty.' 1 5 Therefore, in the case of third-country
assembly, absent a further anti-dumping investigation, if there is a
change in the determination of the place of origin of the dumped
merchandise, the extension of anti-dumping duties on the grounds of the
mere origin of the assembled components may result in a violation of
GATT 1994.116
Another controversial issue concerning the consistency of EU and
US anti-circumvention provisions with GATT 1994 is the extension of
112. See GATT 1994 supra note 4, art. I ("[Aln anti-dumping measure shall be
applied.., pursuant to investigations initiated and concluded in accordance with the
provisions of this Agreement.").
113. EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 50, art. 13(1).
114. Id. art. 13(4)(b)(ii)(i); US Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note
78, at (b)(3)(c).
115. See ADA, supra note 8, art. 5.4 (providing that investigation be initiated when
a qualified majority of domestic producers, on behalf of a domestic industry, files an
application); id. art. 5.2 (noting that applicants must provide relevant information of the
dumping practice including a description of the product, identification or the dumping
producer, countries involved in the practice, export and domestic price, and volume of
exportation); id. art. 5.6 (noting that no investigation may be initiated absent sufficient
evidence of dumping injury to the domestic economy and a causal link between them);
id. art. 6.1 (providing that an investigation must involve all the interested parties); id.
art. 6.2 (stating that they will have a "[flull opportunity for the defense of their
interest"); id. art. 6.4 & 6.5 (requiring information collected during the investigation to
be accessible, absent any confidentiality reason).
116. See DIDIER, supra note 36, at 155; see e.g., ANTI-DUMPING UNDER THE WTO:
A COMPARATIVE REVIEW supra note 48, at 273-274.
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anti-dumping duties in the case of assembly operations that take place in
the domestic market.' 17 This case is similar to the case of assembly
operations in third-countries. In fact, both under the EU and US
regulations, importing parts or components from dumping countries and
assembling them in the domestic market may constitute circumvention
when the assembly operation is not economically relevant with respect
to the entire manufacturing procedure. In the case of a third-country
assembly, both the EU and the US regulations provide the criteria to
define the relevance of an assembly operation. In the case of assembly
in the importing-country, the main concern with the extension of anti-
dumping duties is that this extension might be applied to products,
which are not like products for the purpose of the anti-dumping
investigation, but instead are mere components or parts of the dumped
product. In this case, therefore, the sanction would be applied to
products, which are not technically "dumped," which is inconsistent
with the ADA.'" 8
IV. FROM DOMESTIC TO COMMON PROVISIONS: Is THERE ANY CHANCE
FOR ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION REGULATION UNDER THE WTO?
From a domestic perspective, absent any regulation under the
WTO, the inclusion of anti-circumvention provisions into national anti-
dumping regulation is legitimate in order to protect national industries
from dumping. However, unilateral provisions may be undesirable for
two reasons at least." 9 First, unilateral provisions create a lack of
homogeneity in anti-dumping regulation. 20 Second, as both the EU and
US regulations show, domestic rules on anti-circumvention may
implicitly grant national authorities the discretionary power to apply
117. See GATT 1994 supra note 4, art. VI (stating the anti-dumping and
countervailing duties); see also 2001 USTR Annual Report - World Trade
Organization, at 43, available at http://www.ustr.gov (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
118. Compare ADA, supra note 8, art. 9 (stating that the imposition of anti-dumping
duties must affect only dumped products); with GATT 1994 supra note 4, art. VI(2)
(stating "a contracting party may levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping duty,"
which is consistent with the ADA with regard to the absence of any provision on the
applicability of anti-dumping duties to parts or components).
119. Adamantopoulos & De Notaris, supra note 2, at 55.
120. Id. at 55.
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anti-dumping duties that are not necessarily consistent with the
provisions under the WTO regulation. 21 Until recently, the Informal
Group on Anti-Circumvention has focused the discussion on the
definition of circumvention. In particular, the national representatives
have discussed the opportunity to include within the definition of anti-
dumping the case of assembly operation in third countries. 22 Based
upon this issue, the WTO Members were not able to reach an agreement
during the Uruguay Round.
The difficulty resolving this conflict between importing and
exporting WTO Members is well represented in a case concerning the
extension by the US of an anti-dumping duty order on color television
receivers from Korea.' 23 In 1996, Samsung Electronics filed a request to
review the anti-dumping duty order imposed by the US since 1984.124
The US decided to initiate a review of the anti-dumping measure, but
before doing so, they commenced an anti-circumvention investigation.
125
The Department of Commerce initiated an anti-circumvention inquiry to
determine whether the producer was exporting components to third
countries (Mexico and Thailand), where they were assembled and then
were exported to the US in violation of domestic anti-circumvention
provisions. 126 On November 7, 1997, without a prompt revocation of the
anti-dumping measure, Korea requested the establishment of a panel to
examine whether the continuing imposition of anti-dumping measures
was consistent with GATT 1994.127 In particular, Korea argued that the
anti-circumvention investigation initiated by the US authorities was in
violation of Article VI of GATT 1994 because:
[I]n the absence of a multilateral agreement on... anti-
121. Id. at 56.
122. Report of the Expert Meeting on the Impact of Anti -Dumping and
Countervailing Duty Actions, U.N. Conf. on Trade & Development, Agenda Items 3 &
4, U.N. Doc. TD/B/COM.1/EM.14/2 (2000).
123. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. U.S., 20 C.I.T. 1306, 946 F. Supp. 5 (CIT
1996).
124. Id. at 1306.
125. Id. at 1307.
126. Id. at 1307-1308.
127. United States - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Color
Television Receivers From Korea: Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Korea,
W.T.O. Doc. WT/DS89/7, No. 97-4923 (7 November, 1997) available at
http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
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circumvention legislation, the United States must follow the normal
procedures of GATT 1994 and the [ADA] and, if it so wishes, may
initiate a normal anti-dumping proceeding against Mexico and
Thailand. In this regard, the initiation of the anti-circumvention
proceeding violates Article VI of GATT 1994 and Articles 1, 2.1 and
3.1 of the [ADA], because it may lead to the imposition of anti-
dumping duties on imports of CTVs [color television receivers] from
Mexico and Thailand without findings of dumping and resulting
injury ever having been made. 128
In other words, according to Korea, third-country circumvention
was outside the scope of GATT 1994, and the extension of the anti-
dumping duty order in the case at issue was equal to the application of
the anti-dumping measure to merchandise, which was not subject to the
original anti-dumping investigation. Following Korea's communication,
the US took measures to revoke the anti-dumping duty order, and Korea
withdrew the request for the establishment of a panel.
129
Since the WTO panel was never established, it is impossible to
know how the WTO panel would have settled the dispute and decided
on the compatibility of third-country circumvention with GATT 1994.
However, this case shows how sharp the contrast on the issue is between
the WTO Members. In order to overcome the difficulties that WTO
Members have had in deviating from their partisan perspectives and
reconciling their positions on anti-circumvention policy, some scholars
have suggested that third-country circumvention should be dealt not as
an anti-dumping issue, but as an issue under rules of origin regulation.13°
Indeed, rules of origin are a central issue for GATT 1994 legislation
both for preferential and non-preferential trade purposes, since rules of
origin define important elements of trade paths like the notion of
128. Id.
129. Samsung Electronics Co., LTD., 20 C.I.T. at 1306; see WT/DS89/8 supra note
127.
130. See e.g., Edwin A. Vermulst, Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Concerns for
Developing Countries in the Millenium Round: Key Areas for Reform, paper presented
at UNCTAD Seoul Workshop on the "Positive Agenda" held on June 8-10, 1999, as
contained in UNCTAD; Positive Agenda and Future Trade Negotiations, United
Nations, New York and Geneva, 2000, at 297-298, as reported in Impact of Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duty Actions, paper presented at the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development held in Geneva, December 4-6, 2000,
TD/B/COM. I/EM. 14/2, note 32, at 30.
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relevant product in the case of application of anti-dumping measures.
31
The central notion of GATT 1994 Rules of Origin is that "merchandise
has a single nationality," and, therefore, merchandise imported into a
country must be treated as originated in a single nation. 132 This
classification does not take into account the fact that in the modem
system of a global economy, product manufacture may be dislocated in
different countries, and that several operators may perform different
steps in the manufacturing process. As a result, it is almost impossible
to relate the final product to an individual producer and to an exclusive
place of production, while identifying a single country of origin.
The case of third-country circumvention demonstrates the limits of
an exclusive definition of country of origin. Because anti-dumping
measures are directed to specific countries, the dumped product must
originate in these countries. The WTO Rules of Origin do not define
substantive rules for the determination of the origin of the product, and
instead defer that determination to domestic legislators. 33 As in the case
of EU and US anti-circumvention regulations, the anti-dumping duty
order is extended to third-country imports on the assumption that the
assembly or the completion operation is a minor part of the
manufacturing process. Consequently, the final product is not
considered originated in the country where the assembly operation takes
place, but instead in the country where the components are from.
However, this assumption may be inconsistent with the actual
manufacture process because the relevance of assembly, indeed, depends
on the nature of the final product (i.e. assembling chemical products is
different from kit components). The assumption about the definition of
origin of the assembled product may therefore be in contrast with the
perception of both the original dumping and the intermediate country,
because, depending on the domestic rules of origin denomination, the
assembly operation may have here a different relevance than the
131. See Agreement on Rules of Origin, art. 1.2 and art. 9.1(a) part of Annex 1A to
GATT 1994 supra note 4 [hereinafter GATT Rules of Origin].
132. See Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Post national Economy:
Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REv. 401, 469 (2002); see also Moshe Hirsch,
International Trade Law, Political Economy and Rules of Origin, A Plea for a Reform
of the WTO Regime on Rules of Origin, 36 (2) JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 171 (2002)
(presenting a critical analysis of the present GATT Rules of Origin discipline).
133. GATT Rules of Origin supra note 131, art. 9.2. See Palmeter, supra note 108,
at 66-67.
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relevance estimated by the country that applies the anti-dumping
measures.
In order to reconcile the different national interests of the several
WTO Members, the working committee established by the WTO
Agreement on Rules of Origin has proposed to create separate rules of
origin for individual products, in order to qualify the origin of the
product on the basis of the country where the most significant part of the
operation takes place. 34 This classification would rely on the specificity
of each process of manufacture, and it should not necessarily coincide
with the place of final assembly. Concerning third-country
circumvention, such a system would help in getting over the present
impasse between exporting and importing WTO Members. The
codification of separate rules of origins for individual products, in fact,
would favor predictability in the administration of anti-circumvention
measures and prevent the arbitrary extension of anti-dumping duty
orders by national authorities.135
Third-country circumvention is not the only case upon which
doubts have risen about the compatibility of unilateral anti-
circumvention measures and the multilateral anti-dumping regulation.
In 1990, Japan challenged the validity of the Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 1761/81, concerning the extension of anti-dumping measures to
certain products assembled in the European Economic Community
("EEC") by companies related to Japan against which an outstanding
anti-dumping duty order was already applied.'36  The individual
components, which were imported into the EEC, were not within the
original anti-dumping investigation nor had they been proved to cause
any material injury to a domestic industry. Therefore, it was impossible
to apply the anti-dumping duty order to the individual parts, even if
there was evidence that the same Japanese producers in respect to which
the original anti-dumping order was levied introduced them in the EEC.
134. See Mariana C. Silveira, Rules of Origin in International Trade Treaties:
Towards the FTAA, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 411,420 (1997).
135. See Cao, supra note 132, at 474-480.
136. EEC Regulation on Parts and Components, BISD 37S/132, 1990 O.J. L 6657
(referring to the GATT provision prior to Uruguay Rule as well as to the amended
version of the EU legislation on anti-dumping, the conclusions reached by the GATT
panel may be interesting for analyzing the compatibility of anti-circumvention
regulation with GATT rules) [hereinafter EEC Regulation on Parts and Components].
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The EEC imposed anti-circumvention measures to the components.
Japan objected and, finally, it filed a request to settle the dispute before a
GATT panel. '37
Japan's claim considered not only the specific measures taken by
the EEC, but the entire anti-circumvention provision.138 Japan alleged
that the EEC provision was outside the scope of GATT and it asked to
the GATT Panel not only to request the EEC to revoke the measures at
issue, but also to withdraw the domestic anti-circumvention provision.
The GATT Panel found that in the instant case the administration of the
anti-circumvention provision and the extension of anti-dumping duties
on finished product were in violation of Article III: 2 of the GATT, 3 9
and it concluded that
the anti-circumvention provision in the EEC's anti-dumping
Regulation is not inconsistent with the EEC's obligations under the
General Agreement. Although it would, from the perspective of the
overall objectives of the General Agreement, be desirable if the EEC
were to withdraw the anti-circumvention provision, the EEC would
meet its obligations under the General Agreement if it were to cease
to apply the provision in respect of contracting parties. 1
40
In the past, even the European Court of Justice has expressed some
concerns about the extension of anti-dumping duty orders concerning
the effectiveness of the principle of legal certainty and the respect of the
rights to defense. In particular, the Court has held that the domestic
authorities administering the application of anti-circumvention measures
should take into account that the importers subject to the extension of
the anti-dumping duty are entitled to enjoy the same due process rights
as the importers subject to the original order.14' In fact, the effect of the
137. Id.
138. Commission Regulation No. 2423/88, art. 13.10(a), 1988 O.J. L 209 (allowing
the extension of definitive anti-dumping order "on products that are introduced into the
commerce of the Community after having been assembled or produced in the
Community").
139. EEC Regulation on Parts and Components, supra note 136, at 5.9 (providing
the only pre-WTO case dealing with anti-dumping circumvention).
140. Id. at 5.26.
141. Case T-80/97, Starway SA v. Council, 2000 E.C.R. 11-3099, 110 (2000). This
case concerned the application by a French company for the annulment of a Council
Regulation extending the definitive anti-dumping duty order on bicycles originating in
the People's Republic of China to certain bicycle parts imported into France from the
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extension of the anti-dumping regulation is to enlarge the scope of the
initial anti-dumping duty order and to include similar products or parts
of those products. Consequently, importers subject to the extension of
the order are in a position similar to importers subject to the original
order, with the consequence that they should be granted the respect of
the basic rights to defense which are granted to importers during the
anti-dumping investigation.1
42
In order to grant due process rights to the operators who are
included in the extension of the anti-dumping duty order, it is necessary
to limit the discretion of domestic administering authorities including ad
hoe rules in multilateral anti-circumvention regulations, if any.143 In
particular, anti-circumvention measures should be applicable only if
certain requirements are satisfied. First, anti-circumvention measures
should be applied only to like-products which were in the scope of the
original anti-dumping investigation. 44  Therefore, circumvention by
People's Republic of China. The Court annulled the Council Regulation at issue
holding that the Council erred in extending the anti-dumping duty order to the French
applicant merely because this importer had not required a preventive certificate of non-
circumvention under, EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 53, art.
13(4). According to the Court, requiring such a certification to exclude the extension of
the anti-dumping order is not consistent with the EU Anti-dumping Circumvention
Regulation because it is not possible to impose to importers potentially subject to anti-
circumvention measures duties, which are not imposed to importers subject to the anti-
dumping order.
142. Joined Cases T-74 & 75/97, Buchel & Co. Fahrzeugteilefabrik GmbH v.
Council and Commission, 2000 E.C.R. 11-3067, par. 53 (2000). This case concerned
the application of a German company for the annulment of a Council Regulation that
extended the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed on bicycles originating in the
People's Republic of China to certain bicycle parts imported into Germany from the
People's Republic of China. The German company initiated this action to request an
annulment of a Commission Regulation denying the exemption of imports of certain
parts originating in the People's Republic of China. The Court dismissed the action
holding that since applicant was an importer of products subject to the original anti-
dumping investigations, and since the applicant voluntarily failed to participate in the
investigation, he was in a different position than importers concerned by the extension
of the regulation. Consequently, "[t]he applicant is also not individually concerned by
the provisions of the extension regulation by reason of its participation in the
investigation." Id. at 62.
143. See Adamantopoulos & De Notaris, supra note 2, at 56-58.
144. Id. at 57. The article also notes that some authors have underlined that
436 FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. X
FINANCIAL LA W
assembly operation, which took place in the importing country, should
not be sanctioned if the components of the final product were not
included in the original anti-dumping order.1 45  Second, anti-
circumvention measures should be applied only to producers who were
within the scope of the original anti-dumping investigation. 146 Extension
of the anti-dumping duty order might be possible even with regard to
enterprises related to the producers subject to the original sanction, but
in this case precise standards must be provided in order to define the
nature of the link between the dumping and the circumventing
producers. 47 Finally, in order to extend the anti-dumping duty order,
national authorities must give evidence that the alleged circumventing
practice does not have a due cause rather than avoiding the application
of the anti-dumping duty order. 148 In particular, national administering
authorities must prove both a change in the pattern of trade between the
country adopting the anti-dumping measure and the country where the
alleged circumventing producers are from, 49 and that the circumvention
multilateral provisions do not establish appropriate standards to define like products,
with the result that national authorities have broad discretion in their findings, and in the
past different agencies have held different findings in respect to similar product. Id. at
36-38.
145. RAINER M. BIERWAGEN, GATT ARTICLE VI AND THE PROTECTIONIST BIAS lN
ANTI-DUMPING LAWS 39 (1990). This is the case with Canadian legislation, under
which the national administering authority may include parts of finished goods in the
anti-dumping findings.
146. See id. at 57. Such a provision would permit producers subject to the anti-
circumvention measure to enjoy the minimum ADA due process requirements (e.g.,
access to the anti-dumping investigation by interested parties; time limitation of the
investigation and retroactivity of the anti-dumping sanctions; right to appeal against the
anti-dumping duty order.). See LOWENFELD, supra note 1, at 279.
147. Art. 12.1 (ii) of the Dunkel Draft provided that the inclusion within the scope of
the application of the existing definitive anti-dumping duty was possible when the
"assembly or completion in the importing country of the product ... is carried out by a
party which is related to or acting on behalf of an exporter producer whose exports are
subject to the definitive anti-dumping duty." According to Comment 2 of this article,
the relation between the circumventing importer and the dumping exporter must consist
of "[a] contractual arrangement... covering the sale of the assembled product in the
importing country." See Note 2 to art. 12.1 (ii) of the Dunkel Draft supra note 28.
148. See Adamantopoulos & De Notaris, supra note 2, at 57.
149. See EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 50, art. 13(1); see
also US Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 78 at (a)(3)(A).
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practice has undermined the application of the anti-dumping duty. 50
V. CONCLUSIONS
The above analysis of the EU and US anti-circumvention
regulations shows that unilateral provisions may allow the extension of
anti-dumping duty orders to import activities that were not within the
scope of the anti-dumping investigation. Such an extension may raise
several doubts concerning the respect of due process rights. The
adoption of multilateral anti-circumvention provisions would be
desirable for two reasons. First, setting multilateral provisions would
define the minimum due process standards required for the application
of anti-dumping duty orders. Second, multilateral binding provisions
would limit the discretion of domestic authorities in administering the
extension of anti-dumping duty orders in the case of anti-dumping
circumvention. Generally, multilateral anti-circumvention provisions
should not provide negative treatment of third-country circumvention
although third-country circumvention might indirectly be ruled by
setting new principles of rules of origin. On the other hand, multilateral
anti-circumvention provisions should provide the extension of the anti-
dumping duty order only with respect to merchandise that was within
the original anti-dumping investigation, and only in the case of
unequivocal evidence of the link between the dumping practice and the
circumvention operation.
Until now, the negotiations on multilateral anti-circumvention
legislation have not led to any tangible result. Indeed, not only has the
Informal Group on Anti-Circumvention been unable to draft any
proposal, but it has also been unable to define the concept of
circumvention and the various related strategies. In order to overcome
the present stalemate in the negotiations, the discussion on anti-
circumvention should be raised to the level of negotiations concerning
rules of origin and anti-dumping legislation, instead of focusing on anti-
circumvention as an isolated issue. In particular, provisions defining the
origin of merchandise based on the specificity of manufacture process,
along with new rules defining the extent of the anti-dumping
investigation with regard to both the like-product and the operators
150. See EU Anti-dumping Circumvention Regulation supra note 50, art. 13(1).
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involved in the investigation, would indirectly benefit multilateral anti-
circumvention legislation.
